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Rusk: A Personal Reflection on International Covenants on Human Rights

A PERSONAL REFLECTION
ON INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Dean Rusk*
Many of us Americans look upon the United States as the "citadel" of human rights in the world. We have a far-reaching Bill of
Rights in a written constitution which is enforced by the courts
against the executive and legislative branches of the federal government, state and local governments and agencies, and individuals
and corporate entities in the private sector. Congressional acts supporting human and civil rights penetrate in hundreds of ways into
the detailed workings of our society. An extraordinary American,
Eleanor Roosevelt, played a major role in drafting and publicizing
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1948.1 The United States has
played a leading role in pressing for more progress toward compli2
ance with the human rights portions of the Helsinki Accords.
American foreign policy is steadily influenced by human rights considerations, sometimes quietly and discreetly behind the scenes, at
other times more openly and assertively, with linkages to such
matters as trade and aid. Indeed, our Congress now requires the
Department of State to report annually to it on the status of human
rights in every country in the world-except in the United States!
However, when one examines the rather detailed table of contents of the most recent Treaties in Force, published annually by
the Department of State, one finds no heading for "human rights"
or "civil rights." There are headings for slave trade, traffic in
women and children, and political rights of women. There are human rights aspects to other entries, for instance, relating to prisoners of war and the rules of warfare, to certain limited aspects of na-

* Samuel H. Sibley Professor of International Law, University of Georgia School
of Law; Secretary of State, 1961-1969.
1. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948).
2. Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975,
reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1293 (1975).
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tionality, and to cultural and intellectual matters. And, of course,
many bilateral treaties and agreements impact upon human rights;
these range from national treatment of each other's nationals under
treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation 3 to rather careful safeguards for individuals under extradition treaties. 4 However,
major international covenants on human rights are absent from
Treaties in Force. For example, missing are the overwhelming majority of agreements dealing with labor relations and conditions
proposed by the International Labor Organization. 5 How does it
happen that the United States, which has played such a major role
in promoting human rights on the world scene, has been so reluctant to ratify central international covenants in the same field?
What follows is an effort to throw a little light on that question.
On February 23, 1978, President Carter submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent four major covenants: An International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 6 an International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 7 an International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 8 and the American Convention on Human Rights. 9 The
first three emanated from the United Nations, the fourth from the
Organization of American States. In each case, United States representatives played an active part in negotiating and drafting these
covenants.
In submitting these four covenants to the Senate for the process of gaining its advice and consent, the administration proposed
a total of twenty-seven reservations, declarations, understandings,
and statements. While these will not be examined in detail here,
broadly speaking they would have the effect of- Making the covenants non-self-executing for the United States; clarifying the supremacy of the United States Constitution in the event of any conflict with provisions of the covenants; leaving to the states those
matters that are now considered state responsibilities; reducing
3. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1961,
United States-Belgium, 14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432.

4. See, e.g., Convention on Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, United States-Israel, 14
U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S. No. 5476.
5. Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, adopted June 25,
1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291.
6. G.A. Res. 2106A, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 47, U.N. Doe. A/6014 (1965).
7. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
8. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966).
9. See, e.g., American Convention offHuman Rights,signedNov.22,1969, OAS Official Records OEA/Ser.KIXVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1 (Jan. 7, 1970).
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some provisions of the covenants to "goals" rather than binding obligations; and making it clear that no present federal or state laws
would be required to be changed by ratification. It may be argued
that these reservations, etc., so lacerate the four covenants as to
make ratification a farce. On the other hand, it may be said that
these reservations, etc., are made in the interest of "higher"
standards of human rights, which would be well understood internationally if we were to ratify them, albeit in a somewhat fragmented form. The latter view attaches importance to the presence
of the United States among ratifying states, even if largely symbolic
in result. Further, ratification might give us stronger "standing" to
raise such issues with other governments and give impetus to efforts to continue with our unfinished business at home. The covenants have yet to receive advice and consent.
Let us go back in time a bit. In 1949, it was this writer's privilege, as an Assistant Secretary of State, to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in company with the Solicitor
General, to lead off testimony urging advice and consent for the
Genocide Convention.'" The Convention was short, simple, and
compelling in the aftermath of Hitler's holocaust. That appearance
occurred more than thirty years ago, but the Genocide Convention
has not received advice and consent. President Truman and each of
his successors have expressed a desire that action be taken." The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee has recommended advice and
consent to the full Senate. Almost annually, the leadership of the
Senate has consulted its colleagues on the subject, but this type of
informal nose count has not found the two-thirds vote required for
successful passage. Understandably, the leadership would not wish
to bring the matter to a vote with a prospect of defeat. There is no
way of knowing whether this informal estimate accurately reflects
what the vote would be in a public roll call, but the risk has not
been taken.
This writer has, over many years, discussed these issues with a
considerable number of Senators of varying points of view as well
as with some members of the House of Representatives. Some
clear impressions have emerged concerning why general covenants
on human rights have had such rough sledding in our own body

10.

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,

G.A. Res. 260A, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948).
11. Within a few months of taking office, President Carter sent the Genocide

Convention to the Senate for ratification. See President's Address to the General Assembly, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 397, 401 (Mar. 17, 1977).
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politic. It may be of interest to share these impressions; no attempt
is made here to distinguish between real reasons and mere
pretexts-that judgment is left to the reader.
It must be said, first, that there have been and are a number
of Senators who simply have not wanted the federal government to
intrude into human or civil rights. Those of us who were in the
fray at the time, recall the heated debate and parliamentary difficulty in winning approval for civil rights legislation during the
196 0's. There were times when these bills were in great jeopardy,
although they required only a majority of votes in each house of
Congress. The task of getting a two-thirds vote for an international
instrument such as the Genocide Convention appeared formidable
indeed. Whether rightly or wrongly, the Johnson Administration
did not send to the Senate the U.N. Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which had
been recommended by the U.N. General Assembly in December,
1966. This decision stemmed partly because of the executive
branch's displeasure with certain aspects of the covenants themselves, and partly because submission at that time was looked upon
as a hopeless cause. Too much political blood had been spilled over
major changes in our national laws aimed at bringing all of our citizens under the roof of our Bill of Rights.
Another aspect of our own domestic controversy over civil
rights was the reluctance of many, including some supporters of
civil rights, to offer other nations and peoples any possible role in
our own travail. 12 If these outside voices had intruded into our
own debate, xenophobia and other like emotions could have made
our own solutions more difficult to find. Whether this fear was real
or fancied is not easy to say. Federal troops and federal marshals
were acting in situations of greatest tension; there are those who
are thankful that outside interference did not make matters worse.
It was noted and appreciated at the time that the United States
was not hauled before international bodies for debate over our domestic turmoil. During this period, a Foreign Minister of a nonwhite country put it to this writer in the following terms:
You have no monopoly on such problems. Wherever there are

different races, religions and cultural groups in direct contact
with each other there are problems. We all have them. What we
find stimulating is that your President, your Congress and your
12. See generally Rusk, Book Review, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 609
(1973) (reviewing L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972)).
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Supreme Court, as well as a majority of your people, are trying
to find better answers than you have found before. If you succeed, it will be important not just for you but also for us in try-

ing to sort these matters out for ourselves.
Serious attention to international covenants on human rights
has been partly undermined by skepticism and cynicism about lip
service that is not translated into practice. Some of the most oppressive regimes in the world call themselves "peoples democratic
republics." The Soviet Union has ratified the U.N. Covenants on
Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights; it has also accepted the Helsinki Accords. Human rights
resolutions are usually passed unanimously by the Organization of
American States. Liberally using the benefit of the doubt, one can
count about thirty constitutional democracies in which human
rights are in reasonably good order. In Western Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights' 3 has both substantial meaning
and institutional support. But human rights were generally supported and respected in Western Europe without such arrangements.
For the United States, a treaty is constitutionally a part of "the
supreme Law of the Land.
...
1.4 We are compelled to take treaties seriously as law; we cannot play games with them. Whether
we involve this solemn process in a field in which, for so many nations, words are cheap and performance is scarce is a troubling
question for some, including some Senators.
A more substantial question arises if provisions of international
covenants appear inconsistent with our own United States Constitution. No treaty has thus far been declared unconstitutional by
our Supreme Court. The extravagant language of Mr. Justice
Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.15 encourages some to believe that the treaty power is plenary and not
subject to constitutional limitations. Subsequently, the Supreme
Court warned, through Mr. Justice Black in Reid v. Covert, 16 that
13.

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-

doms, adopted Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
15. 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (delegation empowering President to declare illegal
provisions of arms to states involved in Chaco conflict held constitutional). Mr.

Justice Sutherland wrote: "In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or
listen as a representative of the nation." Id. at 319.
16. 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (American civilian dependents of military personnel
abroad entitled to civilian trial).
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the United States is a creature of the Constitution and that treaties
must meet constitutional requirements-especially 1 7those fundamental guarantees of the rights of individual citizens.
Is it sound policy for the United States to ratify international
covenants that seem to set lower standards than does the United
States Constitution? This question arose thirty years ago with a
provision of the Genocide Convention, requiring that "direct and
public incitement to genocide" be made punishable.' 8 How does
that fit into our own first amendment? Can we take for granted
that any variance between our Constitution and these covenants
would be decided in favor of the Constitution? Despite Reid v.
Covert, the point has not been clearly and definitively established.
It seems most likely, therefore, that any resolution of advice and
consent would include a reservation to clarify this fundamental
question. Senators would consider it too important a matter to be
left to the judges.
A further constitutional question arises from the federal nature
of our political system. There are a number of provisions in these
international covenants concerning questions that are still state
matters in the United States. Marriage, wills, property, the handling of accused persons prior to conviction, and a goal of free
higher education are only examples. Here the famous case of
Missouri v. Holland'9 has cast a long shadow: The Supreme Court
seemed to say that Congress can enact legislation (which Missouri
claimed violated its tenth amendment powers) supporting a treaty
which it would have no power to enact absent a treaty. 20 The result was to move powers to Washington that had theretofore supposedly resided in the states.
There is a certain irony in this objection to international covenants. There has been considerable comment on the increase in
presidential powers in recent decades. There has been less atten17. Mr. Justice Black wrote that "no agreement with a foreign nation can confer
power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from
the restraints of the Constitution." Id. at 16.
18. Art. III(c), G.A. Res. 260A, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948).
19. 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (absent enumerated power to enact legislation protecting migrations of wild birds, Migratory Bird Treaty of 1916 provides valid basis
for Congress to act under necessary and proper clause).
20. Mr. Justice Holmes, for the Court, wrote: "It is obvious that there may be
matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress
Id. at 433
could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could ....
(citation omitted).
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tion to the extraordinary increase in the power exercised by the
Congress during the same period. The Congress now, by legislation and resulting regulations, has reached into myriad details of
the lives of most citizens. Senators are, of course, members of
Congress and have participated fully in this aggrandizement of
power, much of it at the expense of the states. There are moments,
however, when Senators remember that they began as delegates of
the states and become reluctant to modify federal-state responsibilities through the treaty power--especially treaties dealing with human rights.
This writer believes that the United States should play a forthright role in promoting human rights on the world scene. The
U.N. Charter reflects the intimate connection between respect for
human rights and the possibility of organizing a durable
peace-now in a nuclear world. In any event, the world in which
we live could become a chilling and hostile place for Americans
who feel deeply about the values that are central to our political
life. Of course, there are problems concerning how far we go in
"linking" human rights to the rest of the world's business and
about how we can avoid sanctimony about aspirations regarding
which we ourselves have much unfinished business. I would hope
that the Senate would give advice and consent to the Genocide
Convention, with a reservation regarding the first amendment. On
the four major covenants sent to the Senate by President Carter, I
would support advice and consent with two, and only two, reservations. The first would make it clear that if there be any variance
between any part of these covenants and the U.S. Constitution,
the Constitution would prevail. The second would provide that
these covenants are not self-executing, and that the extent to which
they would be given effect as law within the United States would
be determined by the Congress and state legislatures in accordance
with their respective constitutional responsibilities.
It is not known at this moment what attitude the Reagan Administration will take on such covenants. Given the Senate's present membership and the known views of key committee
chairpersons, one cannot anticipate a high degree of enthusiasm for
international covenants on human rights. Whatever the present
prospects, however, one can reflect on many turbulent events that
have occurred since the proclamation of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights more than thirty years ago, and find reason to be-
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lieve that the most revolutionary and powerful political force in the
world today remains the simple notion that governments derive
their just powers from the consent of the governed and that those
who treat simple human dignity with contempt do so at their peril.
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